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Foster v. Flor[idal*
123 S. Ct. 470 (2002)
I. Introduction
Charles Kenneth Foster ("Foster") has been on death row for over twenty-
seven years.' On October 4, 1975, Foster was found guilty and sentenced to
death for stabbing his victim in the throat and ultimately severing his spinal
cord.2 Foster sought review from the United States Supreme Court to consider
his claim that the lengthy delay between his sentencing and his execution consti-
tutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment's provision against cruel and unusual
punishment.' The United States Supreme Court denied Foster's petition for a
writ of certiorari.'
* The Supreme Court Reporter misspelled Florida as "Flordia." See Foster v. Flor[ida],
123 S. Ct. 470 (2002).
1. Fosterv. Flor[ida], 123 S. Ct. 470,471 (2002) (denying certiorari) (Breyer,J., dissenting).
In the past twenty-seven years Foster has appealed or attempted to appeal eighteen times. See
Foster v. State, 369 So.2d 928, 932 (Fla. 1979) (affirming judgments and sentences of trial court);
Foster v. Florida, 444 U.S. 885 (1979) (denying certiorari); Foster v. State, 400 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1981)
(denying motion for stay of execution); Foster v. Strickland, 515 F. Supp. 22, 24 (N.D. Fla. 1981)
(granting stay of execution five days before scheduled execution date until habeas petition could
be heard); Foster v. Strickland, 517 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (denying habeas petition);
Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339,1347-51 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming denial of habeas petition);
Foster v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 993 (1984) (denying certiorari); Foster v. Strickland, 467 U.S. 1268
(1984) (denying rehearing); Foster v. Wainwright, 457 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 1984) (denying habeas
petition); Foster v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 402,403 (11 th Cir. 1987) (affirming denial of habeas petition);
Foster v. State, 518 So.2d 901, 902 (Fla. 1988) (granting new sentencing proceedings to consider
non-statutory mitigators); Foster v. Dugger, 487 U.S. 1241 (1988) (denying certiorari); Foster v.
State, 614 So.2d 455,458 (Fla. 1993) (remanding in part for a third sentencing proceeding because
of a defective sentencing order); Foster v. Florida, 510 U.S. 951 (1993) (denying certiorari); Foster
v. State, 654 So.2d 112,115 (Fla. 1995) (affirming outcome of third sentencing proceeding); Foster
v. Florida, 516 U.S. 920 (1995) (denying certiorari); Foster v. State, 810 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2002)
(affirming denial of post-conviction relief and denial of habeas relief); Foster, 123 S. Ct. at 470
(denying certiorari).
2. Foster, 517 F. Supp. at 599. There was little debate regarding Foster's guilt or innocence;
at trial, Foster remarked on the stand, "I have done it, killed him deader than hell. .. . It was
premeditated and I intended to kill him. I would have killed him if he hadn't had no money and
I know I never told you about it, but I killed him." Foster v. State, 369 So.2d 928, 929 (Fla. 1979).
3. Foster, 123 S.Ct. at 471.
4. Id. at 470.
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II. Anaylsis/Appiation
The majority of the Court did not consider the merits of Foster's claim.'
Three years before Foster, the Court denied certiorari to a similar claim in Knight
v. Florida.6 The defendant in Knight argued that extended incarceration on death
row amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.7
The dissents and concurrences in the Court's denial of certiorari in Foster echoed
the concurrence and dissent offered in Knight.' In Foster, Justice Thomas con-
curred to point out what he considered the utter lack of support for Foster's
"novel claim."9 Justice Thomas continued and stated that one cannot avail
oneself of the procedural safeguards in the capital system and then contest the
inevitable delay of execution."0 According to Justice Thomas, the anxieties of
death row could be avoided if the defendant would simply submit to his execu-
tion and satisfy the will of the people." Justice Thomas justified this opinion
with a description of Foster's gruesome offense. 2 The Justice's statements
skirted the somewhat disturbing notion that the level of constitutional procedure
afforded to a defendant decreases in proportion to the heinousness of his crime.
Justice Thomas also made the practical point that if defendants could
challenge the length of their stay on death row, courts would be much more
reluctant to grant re-hearings and appeals. 3 Justice Thomas's point is a serious
one. If executions were held to be unconstitutional if twenty years elapse after
the original sentencing, defense attorneys would naturally do all they could to
delay at every stage of potential relief while appellate courts might rush decisions
or deny hearings to maintain a defendant's execution eligibility.
Because of the excessive number of years Foster spent awaiting death,
Justice Breyer dissented and urged the Court to consider the possibility of an
5. Id. at 470 (citing Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 942-46 (containing Justice
Frankfurter's reasons for a denial of certiorari which included, "[plertinent considerations of judicial
policy here come into play. A case may raise an important question but the record may be cloudy.
It may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further illumined by the lower courts. Wise
adjudication has its own time for ripening")).
6. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (denying certiorari). The Court's denial of
certiorari was accompanied by a concurrence from Justice Thomas which posited essentially the
same arguments as the Justice made in Foster. Id. at 990-93. (Thomas,J., concurring). justice Breyer
argued that after almost twenty-five years on death row, Knight's claim of cruel and unusual
punishment should be reviewed by the court. Id. at 993-99. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. See id. at 990-92.
8. Foster, 123 S. Ct. at 470-72.
9. Id. at 470.
10. Id. at 470-71.
11. Id. at 471.
12. Id. Justice Thomas stated that "this judgment would not have been made had petitioner
not slit Julian Lanier's throat, dragged him into bushes, and then, when petitioner realized that he
could hear Lanier breathing, cut his spine." Id.
13. Id. at 471.
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Eighth Amendment violation.14 Justice Breyer pointed to the international arena
to argue that excessive time spent on death row could be a cruel and unusual
punishment. 5 Foster has been issued two death warrants and three judicial
reprieves, one such reprieve occurring only days before his scheduled
execution.1 6 The anxiety and uncertainty that a death row prisoner suffers for,
on average, eleven to twelve years, has more than doubled for Foster.17 The
Justice flirted with the notion of a double punishment in this case because, "[i]f
executed, Foster, now 55, will have been punished both by death and also by
more than a generation spent in death row's twilight.""8
It is difficult to foresee a more extreme case than Foster's; therefore, it
seems the Court has decided it will not rule on the issue of whether or not the
death row phenomenon violates the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, Justice
Thomas's words could prove to be an accurate harbinger if states decide not to
execute a prisoner after a certain amount of time; the procedural mechanisms
that currently allow defendants like Foster eighteen attempts to gain relief could
be given short shrift in such a system.
Janice L. Kopec
14. Foster, 123 S. Ct. at 471.
15. Id. at 471-72 (discussing that other nations have found that a fifteen-year-delay can make
execution a cruel punishment and that Canada will consider the years spent on death row when
deciding whether to extradite capital defendants to the United States).
16. Id. at 472; Foster v. Strickland, 515 F. Supp. 22, 24 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
17. Foster, 123 S. Ct. at 471.
18. Id. at 472.
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